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The Origins of reform failure in Central 
Asia 
To understand the reasons for the relative failures of 
the transition to democracy, the formation of a law-
based state and the establishment of respect for human 
rights in the independent states of Central Asia today, 
as well as the role of the international community, one 
has to assess, first of all, the dynamics of the political 
process in this region of the world. In large part, the 
origins of the current weakness of democratic 
processes are the result of developments during the 
final decades of Soviet power. By the early 1990s, 
there arose a situation in which the ruling authorities 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), ruling 
authorities, realising the necessity of reform but at the 
same time wishing to retain power, initiated a set of 
reforms that employed democratic phraseology but 
which aimed first of all at protecting the interests of 
the ruling group. 
In this context, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
the reduction of the CPSU’s power, on the other hand 
and the beginning of independence for the former 
republics of the Soviet Union on the other hand 
resulted in a certain liberalisation of both public 
opinion and social institutions. The first signs of 
political and social pluralism appeared in Central Asia 
in the form of opposition’s political groups and parties 
and independent non-governmental organisations. 
Independent journalists and even independent mass 
media also emerged. For various reasons, the process 
of reform took different forms in each of the Central 
Asian countries. 
The First Secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist 
Party, Nursultan Nazarbaev, proved to be one of the 
most energetic, decisive and far-sighted 
representatives of the Soviet nomenclature. Rejecting 
the Communist rhetoric, and instead offering Kazakh 
national statehood as a main political argument, he 
sought to attract foreign experts and young executive 
technocrats to initiate reforms. Relying upon absolute 
control of the State machinery and valuable experience 
acquired in the Communist Party institutions, 
Nazarbaev introduced a series of macroeconomic 
reforms that achieved important success; he also set up 
an institutional structure for the newly independent 
state. Skilfully balancing between Russia, China, the 
US and Europe, Nazarbaev’s foreign policy has 
allowed the president to gain certain external 
guaranties of security. The establishment of the 
institutional infrastructure of a market economy and 
the launching of investment-efficient economic 
branches, focused primarily upon the considerable 
mineral raw material resources, including oil, gas, non-
ferrous and rare metals in Kazakhstan attracted 
significant foreign investments to be made in the 
country and, correspondingly, has raised the level of 
economic and political interest in Kazakhstan on the 
part of industrialised countries. 
Kyrgyzstan’s President Askar Akayev, being a 
representative of the same Soviet nomenclature as 
Nazarbaev but belonging to its scientific branch, has 
managed to undertake more serious attempts at 
democratisation in the political system and social 
sphere compared with his Central Asian neighbours. In 
part this was possible because of the country’s weak 
economic capacity. As a result of the poor economic 
conditions in Kyrgyzstan, during the 1990s the country 
became increasingly dependent on foreign credits and 
loans, which led to a positive international influence 
on the speed of democratic reforms. Civil society 
quickly developed in the country, as well as the 
institutions of a political system, a parliamentary-based 
form of power, and independent mass media. 
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However, with scarce economic resources, the top elite 
belonging to the same former Communist Party 
nomenclature, were increasingly criminalised and 
prone to corruption, by the early part of this century, 
the economic reforms had slowed almost to a halt 
which led, eventually, to a popular uprising to remove 
President Akaev from power in 2005. 
A brief period of political liberalisation and public 
activism in Tajikistan in the early 1990s was followed 
by a bloody civil war. The legacy of this conflict 
continues to cast a long shadow over Tajikistan today. 
The impact of the war has severely limited the 
economic development of the country and held back 
political liberalisation.  
The First Secretary of the Uzbekistan Communist 
Party, Islam Karimov, initially demonstrated some 
support for a democratic way of development of his 
country (political opposition, independent mass media, 
alternative presidential elections, and a tolerant attitude 
towards NGOs in the early 1990s). Then in the latter 
part of the decade, Karimov moved clearly to a highly 
authoritarian form of rule. Political opponents were 
persecuted and imprisoned or they left the country. 
Under the pretence of combating Islamic radicalism 
and fundamentalism, many religious figures and 
believers were persecuted. The independent mass 
media were almost completely annihilated and many 
foreign non-governmental and international 
organisations were expelled from the country. 
Individuals who did not conform to the new political 
order also came under pressure.  
And finally in Turkmenistan, the First Secretary of the 
Communist Party, Saparmurat Niyazov, very quickly 
stopped all the democratic reforms that had been 
initiated in the newly independent country. Relying 
upon powerful domestic security structures (the army, 
police and special services), he usurped power and 
thereby created a totalitarian regime similar to that of 
North Korea. During the last decade, almost all public 
figures and civil society activists working to develop 
democracy were either imprisoned or left the country. 
Absolute control over the mass media, the judiciary 
system, and the way that people think prohibition of 
different ways of thinking and the creation of a new 
‘iron curtain’ were typical features of Turkmenistan 
under Turkmenbashi. 
It should be noted that Turkmenistan has ratified 
almost all the international agreements on human 
rights but became a member of the UN and the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) without observing its obligations, neither 
within the framework of the ratified international tools 
on human rights, nor those of OSCE. Despite the 
failure to fulfil its international commitments, 
Turkmenistan did not suffer negative consequences. 
 
 
The challenges to democratisation and 
the protection of human rights 
This example of Turkmenistan can be used as a litmus 
test to assess the capacity and possibility of developed 
democratic states to influence the development of 
democracy, civil society and human rights in any 
region of the world, including Central Asia.  This case 
demonstrates, firstly, the weakness of the instruments 
available to the EU states in trying to challenge anti-
democratic developments in Central Asia. Secondly it 
shows the shortcomings of international organisations 
(including the UN and the OSCE) in fulfilling their 
responsibility to challenge states that fail to observe 
their international obligations on human rights 
agreements. 
Thirdly, the situation with Turkmenistan has 
highlighted the crisis of international law in the sphere 
of human rights. International agreements and 
documents on human rights (including juridical 
obligations on democracy and civil society 
development, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights) have become agreements of a ‘second order’ as 
compared with similar agreements in the spheres of 
security and economic cooperation. A failure to 
observe commitments made under the former types of 
agreement seems to imply no consequences for the 
delinquent country  Fourthly, the international 
approach to Turkmenistan points to the observance of 
double standards with respect to democracy and civil 
society development, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights when weighed against economic, 
geopolitical and security considerations. One can say 
that in the modern world, democracy, human rights 
and sustainable development have four enemies: oil, 
gas, the war against terrorism, and geopolitical 
considerations. Moreover, Turkmenistan’s complete 
neglect of its obligations vis-à-vis the OSCE ’third 
basket’(the human dimension commitments), the 
organisation in which the European Union members 
play a key role, renders all the criteria and obligations 
into very abstract notions. 
When assessing the democracy and human rights 
situation in the different countries of the OSCE, 
developed democratic states and notably European 
countries, instead of applying clear criteria fixed in the 
international human rights tools and OSCE documents, 
have begun to practice the so-called ‘comparative 
method’.  Under this method, politicians in Brussels, 
Vienna or Strasburg ask: “Is the situation in 
Kazakhstan, for instance, better or worse than in 
Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan?” “Better” answer the 
ambassadors of West European states in Astana, the 
capital of Kazakhstan. And in this way, the positive 
dynamics in Kazakhstan are noted! With similar 
success, North Korea, Burma, Cuba, etc. could be 
chosen as criteria for comparison. 
Under these circumstances, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Russia and Belarus – all of 
whose records fall short in many respects of meeting  
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the international standards of- human rights and 
freedoms fixed in OSCE documents would look more 
or less decent, since they are being compared to 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Unfortunately, all the 
countries become hostage to this policy: both 
democratic OSCE countries and the ruling elites in 
those countries that are trying to develop 
democratically, and those countries that imitate 
democratic reforms and the peoples of those countries. 
Now it should be noted that the main ‘property’ of the 
Party  nomenclature in the Soviet period was the 
‘armchair’ (formal position), which ensured access to 
comforts, privileges, scarce goods and other 
advantages granted to the elite. Money and property by 
themselves were not as important as a place in the 
Party hierarchy in terms of determining one’s level of 
influence and ensuring access to comforts. 
With the transition to private property and the market 
economy, the situation changed dramatically. During 
this period of change, the main task was to convert the 
‘armchair’ into money and property in the form of 
factories, employment, houses, ships, etc. This effort 
was led by the Party nomenclature in all the republics 
of the former Soviet Union. Having preserved 
complete control of law-enforcement structures (thus 
securing oneself from possible persecutions), and of 
the national mass media (i.e. controlling people’s 
access to information), the Party nomenclature at the 
same time started to build up a new statehood, reform 
the economy and secure its own interests during the 
privatisation processes. 
After the basis of market economy was set up and 
privatisation, or to be precise, property- sharing 
between representatives of the political elite, was 
completed, three challenges have emerged to a lesser 
or greater extent in all the countries of the region, as 
discussed below. 
1.  The legitimation of the outcome of 
privatisation before the general public.  To 
say it plainly, this is to ensure the agreement of the 
people with the fact that the majority of property 
has already been distributed, and to reconcile the 
general population with that fact. The instruments 
of ‘reconciliation’ are various: from absolute 
control of law-enforcement structures, mass 
media, suppressing any resentment, up to 
achieving consent with the results of this 
primary ‘savage’ stage of capital accumulation. 
The consent of the people is obtained by those 
who have accumulated this capital by their sharing 
it with the people through ensuring a visible 
growth of welfare and living standards, and then, 
after all, strengthening the belief that “all the same 
you can change nothing”. 
2.  The legalisation of capital and property 
‘accumulated’ during the transition period in order 
that those who have acquired wealth in this way 
are able to sleep calmly, without being afraid that 
any change of power or dissent would result in an 
unwanted visit by the financial police, 
prosecutor’s office officials or national security 
bodies. 
3.   Securing guaranties against any revision of 
privatisation results, property-sharing, 
investigation and persecution in case of a 
change of power. 
Until these issues are addressed by the ruling 
authorities, all the former-Soviet states will be 
politically unstable. The first countries of the former 
Soviet Union (with the exception of the Baltic states) 
to start an active search for the answers to these 
questions are Georgia, Ukraine and, to some extent, 
Kyrgyzstan – resulting in confrontation and political 
change. We shall see what solutions will be found and 
how successful they will be. In all of these countries, 
the replacement of the Party nomenclature with a new 
elite has just started, and many years must pass before 
the process will be completed, resulting in a certain 
stability of political development. Against this 
background, let us try to assess the state of society and 
people 15 years after perestroika. 
First, the notion of democracy has been significantly 
discredited. It is often identified with anarchy, chaos, 
robbery, the cancellation of social guarantees, criminal 
enrichment, etc. Meanwhile, public opinion does not 
see that all this instability is, in fact, a result of the rule 
by the same Communist Party nomenclature who were 
in charge of the country before the collapse of 
communism. 
Second, freedom remains an abstract notion. The 
majority of society perceives no connection between a 
comfortable life, respect for human dignity, fairness 
and democracy, freedom and human rights. Third, 
definite ideas were formed in the society during the 
transition period with respect to the unjust nature of 
privatisation and  public property-sharing, about its 
practical pillaging and robbery of the people. In 
essence, there is a widely held view that everything 
was taken by those who had power, their relatives and 
criminals closely connected with them. Such deep-
rooted and not ill-founded ideas automatically render 
any wealth as illegitimate as in the mind of the general 
public in the societies of Central Asia. 
Fourth, the population that grew up in an atmosphere 
of permanent lies and manipulation during the Soviet 
era has continued to be highly skeptical of official 
claims and does not trusts official information or rather 
has grown used to constant lies. On the other hand, 
aggressive official publicity, especially the kind that 
proposes simple, though far from truthful answers to 
complicated issues, still remains a very efficient tool. 
And finally, nearly two decades after the end of the 
Soviet Union, the sense of absolute power of the state  
4 | Eugheniy Zhovtis  
remains, while the notion of the futile struggle of the 
‘little man’ with the state, which was deeply ingrained 
in the ‘Soviet’ man, continues today. The individual 
has simply turned away from the authorities and 
officials still more. The notion of an opposition 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ has acquired an even more 
tangible form. The expectation that the State will solve 
our problems has been preserved and has even become 
stronger. We have only to wait and endure a little 
longer. At the same time, we only hope it will not get 
worse! 
Distrust in democratic slogans and disbelief in the 
possibility to change anything have grown such that 
even protests against the failure to pay pensions and 
salaries, which has led to hunger, have attracted only 
as few as several hundred persons. Meanwhile, 
demonstrations agitating for freedom of speech, 
democratic development or political rights can achieve 
little in this atmosphere of apathy.  
In short, authoritarian regimes have been established 
throughout the region: from the totalitarian 
dictatorship in Turkmenistan to the hard authoritarian 
regime in Uzbekistan and up to the more or less ‘soft’ 
authoritarian regimes of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. National mass media of the countries of 
Central Asia are completely controlled by the ruling 
authorities. Political systems are not developed; 
political pluralism, in fact, is absent or reduced to a 
minimum and no real separation of powers has been 
established. Parliaments and local authorities are 
appendages of the executive power, while the real 
levers of power are held by presidential structures, 
with no system of restraints or counterbalances. 
All the constitutions of the region’s countries, which 
formally fix the authority of the three branches of 
power, i.e. legislative, executive and judicial, serve to 
delineate the presidency as an independent branch of 
power, which the ideologists of authoritarianism intend 
to act as a kind of arbitrator and coordinator of the 
other branches’ concerted actions. Such is the original 
interpretation of constitutional democracy in Central 
Asia! 
The most successful macroeconomic reforms have 
been carried out in Kazakhstan, to a certain extent in 
Kyrgyzstan and to a lesser extent in Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. It is  difficult to judge the success of 
economic reforms in Turkmenistan because of a lack 
of information. Nevertheless, even the success of 
macroeconomic reform in Kazakhstan, not to mention 
the slow rates of reform in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
as well as the relative failures in Uzbekistan and other 
countries of the region, highlight another major 
problem: economic reforms at the level of 
microeconomics, at the level of business development, 
and especially small- and medium-sized business 
development, have not been successful.  
For such reform to succeed, at least two conditions 
must be met. There should be a decrease in the level of 
state involvement in economic management at the 
micro level and a sustainable system of the ‘game 
rules’ must be created and supported by efficiently 
operating state institutions and mechanisms. And this, 
in its turn, requires the construction of a law-based 
state – the establishment of the rule of law, a real 
division of powers, the maintenance of judicial 
independence, equality of all citizens before law, the 
fostering of a legal culture and eradication of legal 
ignorance. Unfortunately, due to numerous reasons of 
a political character, these reforms, as a matter of fact, 
either did not begin at all, or were of a vague and 
inefficient nature. 
In addition, there was no system of restraints and 
counterbalances, nor a real division of powers; country 
leaders were not replaced for one and a half decades 
following the collapse of Communism, during which 
time the initial accumulation of capital was effected. 
All this caused severe corruption of the state 
institutions. 
Minimum conditions for political reform 
in Central Asia 
Democratic reforms, construction of a lawful state and 
promotion of respect of rights include, at least, two 
components: 
1.  Reform of the national legislation in the sphere of 
human rights with the aim to bring it into 
conformity with international standards, and  
2.  Reform of the state institutions.  
Reform of the national legislation in the 
sphere of human rights  
It should be noted that in the early 1990s, that the 
countries of the region signed almost all the basic 
international documents on human rights: the 
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights 
and on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights, the 
Conventions on Children’s Rights, on the Liquidation 
of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, Convention on Torture Prohibition, etc. The 
last country to ratify the international pacts on human 
rights was Kazakhstan (2005). The ratification of the 
international agreements on human rights binds the 
participating states to  bring their legislation and 
judicial practice in conformity with their provisions. 
As a matter of fact, however, none  of the region’s 
states has followed this practice in a significant way. 
The constitutions of all the Central Asian countries 
contain sections devoted to human rights and 
freedoms, and the main provisions of these sections 
repeat the articles of the General Declaration of 
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. Any analysis of the laws that 
regulate political rights and civil liberties of these 
states, however, shows that there is a conceptual 
discrepancy between those principles and the norms  
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containing the international tools on human rights. For 
the most part, the national laws retain a Soviet 
legislative spirit which, first of all, was directed at the 
restriction of human rights and freedoms and at 
granting an opportunity to the state bodies and officials 
to interpret those or other norms of the law in their 
own interest. The legislation is constructed on an 
obvious priority of interests of the state before the 
individual rights and freedoms!  
 
Fundamental principles intended to create the laws 
regulating human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
such as the restriction on admissibility check, 
proportionality, legal predictability and definiteness 
are practically not applied in the preparation of draft 
legal acts concerning human rights. If we analyse the 
acts regulating specific rights and freedoms and 
judicial practice, for example, in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan (RK), the above-stated conclusion seems 
to be even more obvious. See box below offering a 
case study of Kazakhstan. 
The lack of observance of basic rights: A case study of Kazakhstan 
a) The right to life. Although amendments to the criminal legislation have been approved in Kazakhstan, concerning 
the possibility to apply lifelong imprisonment as an alternative to the death penalty, and a moratorium on the death penalty 
was introduced, this is still a moratorium on the implementation of death penalty verdicts rather than a moratorium on their 
pronouncement. 
Having ratified in 2005 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Kazakhstan did not ratify the Second 
Optional Protocol to it aimed at canceling the death penalty. Moreover, petitions from high-ranking officials began to 
appear more frequently over the last year about the need to restore the death penalty for terrorism and illegal trafficking of 
drugs. Finally, the national legislation does not determine the status of persons in relation to which the moratorium on 
execution of the death penalty verdict and the circle of their guaranteed rights is uncertain.  
b) The right to freedom from torture. Despite the fact that Kazakhstan ratified the UN Convention against 
torture in 1998, no announcements have been made to date for clauses 21 and 22 of the Convention, i.e. the competence of 
the UN Commission against Torture to consider individual complaints to application of torture in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan has not been recognised. Nor did the country ratify the Optional Protocol to this Convention, concerning the 
monitoring of confinement places for persons in custody for possible application of tortures. 
Having ratified the Convention in 1998, Kazakhstan thus assumed the obligation to bring the legislation into accord with 
the Convention, but the country did not start doing this until 2002, when the Convention-relevant definition of torture was 
included in the criminal legislation. 
In 2001 Kazakhstan submitted a primary report on the implementation of the Convention against Torture. After the report 
was considered, the UN Commission against Torture submitted 16 recommendations to the government of Kazakhstan, of 
which only three have been implemented. There is no independent agency in the country to investigate claims of torture 
made by the victims, nor effective procedures for documenting torture. Moreover, judiciary experience shows that many 
complaints about torture in the overwhelming majority of cases are dismissed by the judges as an attempt by the 
defendants to escape responsibility and therefore no effective investigation is carried out. 
c) The right to freedom of speech, expression and access to mass media. This right is regulated by the 
Law on Mass Media, which is practically a continuation of the Mass Media Law that applied in the Soviet Union in the 
late 1980s. Despite the constitutional interdiction of censorship, this law is practically aimed at the creation of a large-scale 
monitoring system for mass media, with the participation of public prosecutors and a special state body – the Ministry of 
Culture and Information. 
The Republic of Kazakhstan’s criminal legislation contains norms connected with criminal liability for insults and slander 
and, separately, for encroaching on the honour of the President and deputies of Kazakhstan’s parliament. Statutory acts 
published by state agencies, such as rules mandating mass media registration or journalists’ accreditation, render the laws 
of Kazakhstan relating to freedom of speech still more inconsistent with international standards. 
Finally, legislation to combat extremism and terrorism and on national security, which is being constantly supplemented, 
still contains many clauses that either directly limit the freedom of speech, or give the opportunity to the authorities to 
interpret ambiguous definitions and in whichever way they wish. In spite of numerous appeals by the OSCE 
Representative to bring the RK’s legislation concerning freedom of the mass-media into conformity with international 
standards, the situation has not changed. 
d) The right to freedom of association. As with the regulation on freedom of speech, this right is regulated by 
the Law on Public Associations which, in essence, is a continuation of the Public Association Law accepted in the Soviet 
Union in the late 1980s. The requirement of obligatory registration of public associations – contradicting international 
standards – is still fixed in the legislation, thereby practically forbidding the activities of informal public associations. 
Moreover, the administrative and criminal laws contain the norms that provide for responsibility for infringement upon the 
legislation on public associations on the whole, rendering it practically impossible to discern what offence has been  
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committed and what responsibility will be applied. And, as in the case of the regulation of freedom of speech, the process 
of constantly adding legislation to counter extremism  and to combat terrorism means that there are more and more norms 
that either directly limit freedom of speech, or give the authorities the opportunity to interpret ambiguous definitions in 
whichever way they wish. 
As a result of a mismatch between fair opaque principles and legal proceedings, some foreign and religious organisations 
were identified as extremist or terrorist in nature in absentia by decisions of judicial bodies. Although it is true that the 
majority of these organisations really are composed of extremists or terrorists, still the process of legally determining this 
status did not correspond to the requirements of Kazak legislation, and relevant court decisions were not promulgated. 
The law on political parties also does not conform to international standards, establishing an unreasonable registration 
threshold of 50,000 members for a country with a population of 15 million, a complicated procedure for a person to 
acquire legal status, with the requirement to collect personally in one place 1,000 founding members of a party, with 
checks of the names performed by the judicial authorities, etc. 
e) The right to participate in the management of the country. The existing election law does not provide 
real political pluralism and equal opportunities for opposition parties and candidates; instead, it lays the foundations for 
conditions favouring the government. This bias is particularly notable in the formation of election commissions, which are 
almost entirely composed of representatives of pro-government parties, organisations or official bodies. Thus, during the 
period between elections, opposition parties and candidates have practically no access to national mass media. As a result 
of such practices, in a country with a population of 15 million where the official number of supporters of opposition 
political parties totals nearly half a million persons, there is only one opposition deputy in both chambers of Parliament 
(out of 116 deputies), and the opposition has almost no representation in local representative authorities. The law on local 
government has not yet been passed, in spite of the requirement to do so in the 1995 Constitution. 
The discrepancy between legislative and judicial practice in the country compared to international standards has been so 
great that no elections in Kazakhstan, including presidential, parliamentary or local ones, have been recognised as 
corresponding to international standards by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) during all the 
years it has sent election observation missions to Kazakhstan. 
There is a similar situation with respect to freedom of conscience and the right to a fair court proceeding. As far as the 
latter right is concerned, a special lecturer of the United Nations on the independence of judges and lawyers visited 
Kazakhstan in 2004. He published a report about this mission in 2005 containing many recommendations, a majority of 
which have never been implemented. These features found in Kazakhstan are, to more or less the same degree, typical of 
all the countries of the Central Asian region. 
Reform of the state institutions  
The progress achieved with respect to reforming state 
institutions in Central Asia is even worse than the 
situation prevailing in the area of national legislation 
on human rights. The majority of the state institutions, 
– first of all, law enforcement bodies, national security, 
the public prosecutor’s office and the courts – are the 
direct successors of the Soviet system and they 
continue to be Soviet in spirit in their organisational 
structure, ideology and their involvement in public 
policy. 
The constitutions of all the countries of the region, 
while formally based in principle on the division of 
authorities and the creation of a system of ‘restraints 
and counterbalances’, are, as a matter of fact, the main 
laws of authoritarianism in which the competence and 
powers are redistributed heavily in favour of the 
presidential branch of power. The presidents of all the 
countries of the region (with the exception perhaps of 
Kyrgyzstan, where efforts have been taken to revise 
the constitutional articles with the purpose of 
restricting presidential power in favour of the 
Parliament) possess unlimited political opportunities to 
control the state and society. 
One can say that all the levers of actual country 
management are concentrated in presidential 
administrations and agencies in which relevant 
departments carry out both external and internal 
policy. The system of such management of the 
structure, ideology and style of management reminds 
one of the supervising structures of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The small and 
powerful group around the president, which includes 
administration officials and a number of the most 
influential government officials, resembles, in many 
respects, the Politburo and administration itself – the 
Central Committee of the CPSU. 
In practically all the countries, national security bodies 
and public prosecutor offices are not a part of the 
government, but rather are directly subordinate and 
accountable to the president, thus providing the basis 
for and supporting presidential power. In view of the 
almost unlimited authority of presidents in Central 
Asia, these state bodies have such extensive functions 
that they directly participate in the main political 
process and the political struggle inside each country. 
When speaking about Kazakhstan, the unique 
governmental structure that has undergone structural 
reforms from the point of view of human rights and 
freedoms is the penitentiary system. Its transfer from 
under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
to the authority of the Ministry of Justice was a serious 
step to its demilitarisation and transformation from a 
retaliatory into a corrective establishment, although 
there have only been initial steps in this direction.  
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The introduction of legal proceedings with the 
participation of a jury could also be worth mentioning. 
For the rest, the state institutions have not only not 
come nearer to international standards from the point 
of view of maintaining human rights and freedoms, but 
they keep on becoming tools in the political struggle 
reflecting and protecting the interests of the ruling 
elite. 
As was already noted, the Ministry of Culture and 
Information ‘supervises’ and controls the mass media. 
In this capacity, the ministry periodically proposes 
initiatives to introduce anti-democratic amendments 
into the current legislation. There is a special 
representative body under the Ministry of Justice – the 
Committee on Religious Affairs that was set up to 
control religious associations. The Committee carries 
out its ideological functions in the best traditions of the 
Soviet past. 
The control over the non-governmental organisations 
and political parties, which was previously carried out 
by the Ministry of Culture, Information and Public 
Consent (nowadays the Ministry of Culture and 
Information), is now basically carried out by the public 
prosecutor’s office and national security and internal 
affairs agencies. Thus, there are special departments on 
communication with public associations in the system 
of internal affairs and departments of public security. 
Those departments essentially carry out the functions 
of political police. According to the concept of the 
activities of the public prosecutor’s office, among the 
seven strategic directions pertaining to the realisation 
of supervising functions, the control of mass media 
and public associations is included. 
Despite the introduction of legal proceedings with the 
participation of a jury, which, as has already been 
noted, could certainly be considered an important 
positive step, the court remains under obvious political 
control and it is extremely difficult to call it as an 
independent branch. Finally, all the state institutions 
are severely affected by corruption, which bears a 
systemic  character and penetrates the state system 
from top to bottom. 
In 1993, the Republican Commission on Human 
Rights was set up in Kazakhstan under the President of 
the Republic, and in 2002, the Institute of the 
Representative for Human Rights and the National 
Centre on Human Rights were also created. It was 
intended that these measures would represent a serious 
step on the way towards the creation of national 
institutions for human rights. However, these 
structures were created by Presidential decree, and as a 
result, they are essentially a part of the President’s 
administration and therefore cannot be considered as 
independent national structures for human rights. Their 
creation, subordination, powers and competence 
appreciably fall short of the Paris Principles of the 
United Nations regarding the status of national 
establishments engaged in the promotion and 
protection of human rights. 
With conceptually suspect legislation in the sphere of 
political rights and civil freedoms, as well as 
unreformed state bodies which tend to retain Soviet 
habits, it is not difficult to predict the inefficiency of 
procedures and the discrepancy between Kazakhstan’s 
judicial practice and international standards. 
The development of civil societies, as implied by the 
development of political parties, trade unions, non-
governmental organisations, independent mass media 
and other public institutes, has practically failed in all 
the countries. The civil society of Turkmenistan 
simply does not exist in any sense of the word. The 
non-governmental sector of Uzbekistan is completely 
controlled by authorities, and any display of civil 
consciousness that does not coincide with the official 
point of view is generally persecuted. In Tajikistan, the 
activities of non-governmental organisations are 
severely limited at the psychological level due to the 
consequences of civil war. The most advanced 
development of civil society has been realised in 
Kazakhstan and, especially, Kyrgyzstan, but even 
there, one cannot speak about a consolidated and 
institutional expression and reflection of social needs 
and interests. 
What is the role of the international 
community and, first of all, the US and 
the EU in this process?  
Directly following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the international community, on behalf of international 
organisations, international financial institutions and 
individual states (first of all, western ones), started to 
render active assistance to the newly independent 
states to help set them on their feet. In the region of the 
Central Asia, these activities were also aimed at the 
creation of a capable state system and a strengthening 
of the law and order structures (army, law 
enforcement, national security bodies), reform of the 
economy and the development of democracy, a law-
based state and the rule of law. 
One can see that the motivation, resources, methods 
and technologies used were inseparable from the 
interests of various international organisations or 
individual countries. Among these interests were both 
geopolitical and economic interests, as well as the 
interests of regional and global security, and, to some 
extent, common human interest for promoting 
universal values, including democracy, freedom and 
human rights. In addition, it is necessary to consider 
that all the assistance in the reforms in this region was 
carried out with a geopolitical ‘amendment’ for the 
interests of China and Russia. 
As far as the assistance is concerned for the creation of 
more or less capable state institutions that would allow 
us to speak of the countries of the region as ‘real 
states’, then we can speak of certain successes, 
although the events in Kyrgyzstan have shown that 
these systems are unstable, and nobody knows how  
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they will develop when there is a change of power. So 
far there are many more questions than answers in the 
field of economic reform in all the countries, except 
possibly Kazakhstan. 
Now we shall try to estimate the international 
community’s policy efficiency in Central Asia in the 
sphere of democracy development, building a law-
based state and respect for human rights and freedoms. 
Looking at the problem from the perspective of 
someone in the region in question, this policy was 
based on a number of basic theses: 
  Representatives of the top Party nomenclature are 
inclined to carry out economic and political reforms. 
They head the states that became independent and 
consequently aspire to be accepted in the international 
community, to become participants of international 
relations and international trade. This desire in itself 
can be a good catalyst on the way to democratisation. 
  The process of democratisation will take a lot of time 
and changes of, at least, one or two generations, 
especially to move beyond the generation of those 
raised with a Soviet mentality and communist 
ideology. Therefore the main emphasis should be 
placed on ‘pushing’, where possible, reforms and 
‘work for the future’, to prepare the next generations, 
free from the Soviet past and open to progressive and 
more rational mechanisms of governmental and social 
management, to bring change. 
  Sustainable development is, first of all, about 
economic development and the maintenance of 
security. If the ruling elites guarantee it to a greater or 
lesser extent,  then it is possible ‘to forgive’ some 
deviations from fundamental ideas of democracy and 
human rights fixed in international obligations. 
  Encouraging freedom, democracy, ideas of the open 
civil society, a law-based state and human rights 
should be carried out, bearing in mind local attitudes, 
traditions and the cultural features of the region.  
Such reasoning has had a direct influence on the 
programme of the help implemented in the region, by 
both international organisations and by individual 
states. It should be especially noted that due to a 
number of objective and subjective reasons, the short-
term and intermediate-term measures to promote 
democratic reforms in the countries of Central Asia 
have never produced an impression of well-elaborated 
and well-coordinated strategies. 
Instead, there is the impression that international 
organisations such as the United Nations and the 
OSCE are considerably limited in the extent to which 
they can facilitate reforms in such a politically 
sensitive spheres as the development of democracy, 
civil society and fostering a culture of human rights. In 
this respect, however, the policy of the OSCE was 
certainly more transparent and progressive. The 
international financial institutions, such as the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
and the Asian Development Bank, did not undertake 
any specific steps in this direction except for declaring 
an interest in sustainable development and political 
modernisation in the region. 
The European Union as a community of European 
states has not developed a clear and coordinated 
position in relation to democratic processes in the 
region, with the exception of some resolutions by the 
European Parliament. Instead, each of the European 
states has followed and protected its own interests in 
the region, first of all economic interests (namely 
energy resources) and geopolitical interests. It is 
sufficient to mention that during all the 1990s, 
European countries such as Germany, France, Italy, 
Spain and even Great Britain carried out no public 
policy in relation to the political processes and 
development of democracy in the region. Only the US 
made regular appeals for political reform and for the 
development of democracy and respect for human 
rights, irrespective of the motives it was guided by. In 
2001-04, the situation began to change a little, while 
European policy became more visible only during the 
past three to five years. 
As has already been noted, assistance to the countries 
of the region from international organisations and 
western states has basically been directed at resolving 
the problems of the state-building, eliminating sharp 
social and economic disparities, reforming the 
economy and strengthening the national and regional 
security systems. In the field of democracy and civil 
society development, these programmes were basically 
directed at the support of non-governmental 
organisations, reform of legislation and legal institutes 
and development of educational projects. 
All the countries of the region developed personified 
authoritarian political systems, in which power is 
concentrated in the hands of the leaders, presidents and 
their close circle of advisors. No serious political or 
economic decision is possible without the clearly 
expressed political will of the head of state. And this 
political will should not only be clearly expressed, but 
also be accompanied by concrete steps to put it in 
practice. 
It is especially important to distinguish between the 
genuine political will to accept democratic reform and 
its imitation. The ruling post-communist elites of the 
former Soviet Union have learned not only how to 
build ‘manageable democracies’ as defined by Russian 
President Vladimir Putin, but also how to build 
‘imitative’ or ‘façade’ democracies. That is, the state 
and social systems are similar in form to constitutional 
democracies (provision of constitutions, elections, 
parliaments, local representative bodies of power, 
political parties, mass media, etc.), while in their 
content they are not so far away from the Soviet 
system.  
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Unfortunately, a large number of the programmes 
organised by the international community in the sphere 
of democracy development, state-building and 
promotion of human rights and freedoms in the region 
simply managed to support this imitation of 
democratic development. These were programmes on 
inter-parliamentary cooperation, judicial reform, 
legislative processes, etc. Their failure was explained 
by western politicians with the help of an argument 
offered by the ruling elites of the region’s countries, 
based on the above-stated theses:  
  Reform should first focus on the economy and security 
and then on democracy and human rights.  
  The democratic process is a long process. 
  The countries of Central Asia must first overcome the 
legacy of totalitarianism and communist ideology. 
  The Asian mentality should be accounted for. 
  Ruling elites are basically ready for political reforms, 
but the people are not, and geopolitical conditions are 
adverse. 
Certainly, this criticism of the international 
community’s role in democratic reforms (or in its 
absence) in the region is not universally applicable and 
all-condemning. Educational programmes, assistance 
in the development of civil society, support for public 
debate in the society, at least in Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, had and continue to have a 
positive impact. Some programmes aimed at the 
abolition of the death penalty or reform of the 
penitentiary system were also rather successful. 
However, these are more likely to be the exception 
rather than the rule. As can be seen, there have been no 
system changes. And this means that both the strategy 
and the content of supporting programmes require a 
certain revision. 
What can we say about the international 
strategies, policy and programme of 
support pursued in Central Asia? 
1. The policy should be fair, especially that at the 
international level  
During the Soviet time, the population was, 
metaphorically, trained to believe that 2x2=25 in the 
social and political sphere of our region. Right after 
‘perestroika’ was finished, it was, in effect, declared 
by the authorities that 2x2=8 and still one should be 
grateful to the authorities that nobody forces them to 
say it is 25. Over 15 years after the Soviet Union’s 
collapse, the population is no longer forced to believe 
what is patently false. Rather, arrangements in each of 
the Central Asian countries ensure that through 
voluntary-compulsory mechanisms the population has 
come to accept that 2x2=25, or 4.8, or 4.5, depending 
upon the rigidity or softness of the authoritarian 
tendencies in the country. And in so doing, the 
authorities sometimes cite the US or a European 
country as an example of where they also from time to 
time say that for the reasons of political expediency it 
is temporarily necessary to consider that 2x2=4.15….  
The European Union, as a whole, and each European 
country individually should consistently insist that 
2x2=4 and that according to the international 
documents on human rights and the concepts accepted 
in the international community on freedom of speech, 
associations, movement and peaceful assembly, fair 
legal procedures and fair elections, the division of 
authority and systems of checks and balances are all 
understood as absolutely concrete things. 
The problems of manipulation, distortion and 
substitution of concepts relating to the key elements of 
the human dimension – the developments of 
democracy, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights – have become so sharp in the world that they 
require special attention. All the governments of the 
developed democratic countries, international 
organisations and international remedial organizations 
must undertake serious efforts at the international level 
to strengthen international remedial mechanisms and 
world politics in the sphere of human rights. 
These efforts are especially urgent in the light of direct 
attacks by Russia, Belarus and other authoritarian CIS 
states on the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, in particular, on the OSCE 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 
on the missions of observers from the OSCE and the 
European Union, and on the  OSCE centres in some 
countries. It is also necessary to resist attempts to 
transform international law and international 
agreements in the sphere of human rights into the so-
called ‘soft’ rights or ‘soft law’, as well as to default 
from obligations within the limits of which it is 
considered a usual phenomenon. 
The EU should endeavour to ‘reanimate’ the clauses 
that are contained in basic documents on human rights 
accepted within the OSCE framework, in particular, 
the documents of the Copenhagen and Moscow 
meetings on the human dimension, especially those 
relating to the extraterritorial nature of human rights. It 
is necessary to resist the attempts to declare human 
rights an internal affair of the states, which in one form 
or another is already ideologically propagandised in 
the documents of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO) and the Collective Security 
Treaty. 
In sum, if the EU whishes to influence the observance 
of human rights and freedoms in Central Asia, it must 
interact with international organisations and the 
governments of the democratic states, to take 
advantage of every possible opportunity to exert 
pressure ion the authorities.   
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2. The regional approach should be used very 
cautiously. 
The EU has begun to use more frequently in its 
relations with the region. Despite their geographical 
proximity, the countries of the region strongly differ 
both in history and in economic capacity, in culture 
and in the way they have developed over the course of 
the past 15 years. Against this background, a ‘cross-
border’ programme on democratic development and 
promotion of human rights will be artificial and in 
some cases simply unfeasible. Generally speaking, the 
regional political identification can cause erroneous 
strategies and decisions. Regional projects can be quite 
effective in limited spheres e.g. labour migration, 
regional trade, regional security, the struggle against 
the trafficking of people and drug-dealing, and projects 
connected with the distribution of water resources. 
As a whole, there have been modest results during the 
past 15 years by the European Union in its 
participation in the political development of the 
countries of Central Asia, especially regarding the 
promotion of democracy, freedom and human rights. 
This shortcoming is in a certain sense a challenge to 
European policy, and many things depend on how 
deeply the results of past failings will be analysed, and 
whether the proposed corrections of strategy will be 
adequate to the task in the region.   
3. European policy in the region should in full 
measure take account of the condition of the society 
15 years after perestroika and the nature of the 
ruling political elite as well as the prospects for 
political development. 
 It is obvious that the internal political processes in all 
the region’s countries will be, first of all, connected 
with intra-elite processes. It is improbable that any 
serious political changes will be connected with 
movements ‘from below’. For the time being, politics 
in the region will be a ‘top-down’ process. And under 
these circumstances, such a policy should be 
sufficiently flexible, but consistent considering the fact 
that the ruling elites are not solid. To some extent, both 
progressive and conservatives elements are present 
within their ranks, and, besides, China, and especially 
Russia exert influence on the internal political 
processes in the region, because in those countries 
similar processes are also taking place. 
Every possible effort should be made to maintain the 
dialogue with the society for the development of 
mutually acceptable political decisions, especially 
those connected with the continuity of power. In 
addition, individual efforts should be taken to 
counteract negative anti-democratic tendencies coming 
from Russia, which are appreciably supported and 
promoted by the authoritarian leaders of the region.  
4. To facilitate democracy development in Central 
Asia, two strategies are available for the 
construction of lawful states, civil societies and 
respect for human rights depending on the 
disposition of the country’s political leadership. 
i)  For countries where there is  a  clearly 
expressed political will to accept systemic 
democratic reforms and to take concrete 
steps towards its realisation. In this case, the 
European Union, individual states, international 
organisations, and other donors should efficiently 
use the available financial, political and economic 
resources to facilitate these reforms with a 
maximum involvement in this process of local 
NGOs, national experts, scientists, practitioners, 
etc. Desspite the fact that no political will is 
expressed for political modernisation or systemic 
democratic reforms in Turkmenistan or 
Uzbekistan, and it is poorly expressed in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, it is 
nevertheless quite possible to initiate certain 
systemic steps in some directions. 
ii)  For countries where there is no political will for 
systemic democratic reforms on the part of the top 
leadership. In this case, first, it is possible to direct 
efforts towards the formation of such a political 
will, through appeals to the observance of 
international obligations through economic and 
political levers, including a country’s aspiration to 
expand trade relations or to integrate more closely 
into European structures, including the desire to 
preside over the OSCE. And secondly, if the 
emergence of such a political will, for whatever 
reasons, is improbable, one can assist in preparing 
for such reforms in the future when either the 
necessary political will would emerge, or there is a 
change of power creating more favourable 
conditions. Such assistance can be provided by 
helping with the creation of a viable concept for 
such reforms, producing ideas and promoting 
educational programmes.  
Such strategies should be directed in equal measure 
towards all components of democratic reform in the 
region: legislative, institutional and judicial. 
To concentrate assistance on personnel retaining, 
capacity-building is inefficient when carried out under 
conditions of unreformed legislation and unreformed 
institutions. Frequently, such programmes lead to the 
opposite result, leading the personnel of official 
institutions to be more cynical and legally ignorant. 
Therefore the programmes aimed at achieving reform 
should encompass to some extent all three 
components, and only in the context of reforming the 
legislation and the institutions can one speak about the 
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5. The implementation of programmes should be 
coordinated as much as possible. 
Various international organisations, including 
interstate ones, frequently implement the same 
programmes in the sphere of human rights, and, 
unfortunately, with the same low degree of efficiency. 
External and internal actors should be brought together 
into a serious coalition to be able to carry out similar 
programmes to facilitate reforms in the sphere of the 
rule of law and promotion of human rights and 
freedoms. In doing so, the strategies and programmes 
will probably differ substantially from one country in 
the region to another. 
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